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of power between the states and the federal government. The states retain
the power to protect their citizens from the evils of alcohol while the federal
government retains supremacy in international matters and control over the
essential aspects of interstate commerce.
DENNIS J. ROBERTS II
Labor Law—Collective Bargaining Agreements.—John Wiley & Sons,
Inc. v. Livingston.1—This action was brought by District 65, Retail, Whole-
sale, and Department Store Union, AFL-CIO, against John Wiley & Sons,
Inc., under Section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act? The
Union sought to compel Wiley to arbitrate under a collective bargaining
agreement between the Union and Interscience Publishing, Inc. Interscience
had merged with Wiley four months before the agreement was to have ex-
pired and no longer existed as a corporate entity. The agreement did not
expressly bind successors of Interscience. Wiley closed the Interscience plant
and moved the 80 employees of Interscience to its own plant where they were
mingled with the Wiley force of about 300. None of the latter were unionized.
The district court assumed that the agreement survived the merger and
that it bound Wiley, but denied the Union's petition on other grounds . 5 The
court of appeals reversed and directed arbitration, holding that the merger
did not ipso facto extinguish all rights of the Union and the employees arising
out of the collective bargaining agreement. 4 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari. 5 HELD: Wiley is compelled to arbitrate where (1) the merger did
not change the nature of the business entity, (2) the transfer of employees
was effected without difficulty, and (3) the Union made clear and maintained
its position before and after the merger.
The Supreme Court reasoned that the preference for arbitration under
the national labor policy is controlling. The shift from one corporate orga-
nization to another will in most cases be facilitated and industrial strife will
be avoided if employees' claims continue to be resolved by arbitration rather
than by tests of strength. This policy favoring arbitration would, in fact, be
thwarted if employers could circumvent the duty to arbitrate by altering
corporate structures. The Court concluded that these policy considerations
are not overcome by the fact that Wiley did not sign the agreement since
1 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
2 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. 185(a) (1958).
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or
between any Such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the
United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in con-
troversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
8 Livingston v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 203 F. Supp. 171 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
The application was denied because the Union had failed to follow the grievance procedure
established in the collective bargaining agreement.
4 Livingston v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 313 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1963), noted 5 B.C.
Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 193 (1963).
5 373 U.S. 908 (1963).
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the common law principles of contracts should not strictly govern collective
bargaining agreements.
Extending the preference for arbitration to the point of compelling non-
signers to arbitrate is not unreasonable in light of the development of national
labor policy. The concept of a "national labor policy" 0 originated with the
Supreme Court's interpretation of section 301(a) in Textile Workers v.
Lincoln Mills.' The Court upheld the overwhelming majority of lower courts
in finding that section 301 did more than confer jurisdiction on the federal
courts to try cases involving labor organizations which affect commerce.° The
Court found in section 301 a directive to the federal courts to fashion a body
of federal law for the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements. In-
cluded in that federal law is povver to grant specific performance of promises
to arbitrate grievance disputes.9 The policy behind section 301 was expressed:
Statutory recognition of the collective bargaining agreement as a
valid, binding, and enforceable contract is a logical and necessary
step. It will promote a higher degree of responsibility upon the
parties to such agreements, and will thereby promote industrial
peace.'°
The Supreme Court stated in Lincoln Mills, that the arbitration clause is a
major element in the collective bargaining agreement. It is the quid pro quo
for a no-strike agreement. 11
Before 1960, arbitration clauses were interpreted and enforced according
to standard principles of contract as required by International Ass'n of
Machinists v. Cutler-Hammer, Inc." Privity of contract was required to bind
any employer, and courts would compel arbitration only if the agreement
specified that the particular type of dispute was to be subject to arbitration.18
The turning point in national labor policy was the 1960 Steelworkers
decisions" which made obsolete the strict contract approach of Cutler-
Hammer" and described the role of arbitration in national labor policy.
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nov. Co.," the most significant of
the Steelworkers cases, decreed that since arbitration clauses are the major
factor in achieving industrial stabilization through the collective bargaining
contract, all disputes must be held to come within the scope of grievance and
arbitration provisions, unless specifically excluded. 17 The Court thus ex-
Supra note 1, at 544.
7 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
Id. at 450-51.
9 Id. at 451; see 93 Cong. Rec. 3656-57 (1947) (remarks of Congressmen Hartley
and Barden).
10 S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 17-18 (1947).
11 Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, supra note 7, at 455.
12 271 App. Div. 917, 67 N.Y.S.2d 317 (1947).
18 Id. at 918, 67 N.Y.S.2d at 318.
14 United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960) ; United Steel-.
workers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960) ; United Steelworkers v.
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
16 International Ass'n of Machinists v. Cutler-Hammer, Inc., supra note 12.
18 United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., supra note 14.
17 Id. at 581.
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pressed a willingness to find an agreement to arbitrate where there is none,
refusing to ignore only the parties' expressed intention to exclude certain
matters from arbitration. At present, an allegation that there is a dispute as
to the meaning or application of any of the terms of the collective bargaining
agreement provides sufficient basis for federal courts to order arbitration."
Special qualities of the collective bargaining agreement make this
approach to arbitration clauses necessary. These agreements differ significant-
ly from the ordinary commercial contract in several respects:"
(1) There are three parties to the agreement—management, labor,
and the union. Labor is further divided into individual workers
with personal grievances. The complexity and diversity of the
interests of these parties require the talents of a specialist to resolve
disputes.
(2) Similarly, the vast range of topics covered calls for expert inter-
pretation when discord arises. Moreover, since the agreement must
be kept simple enough to be understood by the workers, incom-
plete phrasing is inevitable. The arbitrator is best equipped to
fill unavoidable gaps.
(3) The agreement is in force for an extended period, not for a
single transaction. Thus the number of unforeseeable problems which
may arise is greatly multiplied over a period of time.
The result of collective bargaining then is not, strictly speaking, a
contract of employment; it is rather a trade agreement governing the terms
of the relationship between employer, employees, and union. 20 The Warrior2'
Court notes that it covers the entire employment relationship, calling it "a
generalized code to govern a myriad of cases which the draftsmen cannot
wholly anticipate."22
 Consequently, many provisions of the agreement must be
expressed in general and flexible terms. Arbitration is the means of solving
the unforeseeable by molding a body of law for all problems which may
arise. In expressing a preference for arbitration, the Warrior Court took
it as an alternative, not to litigation, but to industrial strife."
When the Wiley case was decided, it was the furthest extension to date
of the willingness of the courts to abrogate traditional contract theory to pro-
mote arbitration. However, obligating successor employers to honor the arbi-
tration clauses of collective bargaining agreements of their predecessors where
the agreement specifically provides for arbitration of the disputed matter
is not much more extreme than finding agreements to arbitrate in contracts
where none are expressed. The courts have had no trouble justifying the
latter in terms of the goal of industrial peace. 24 The same purpose is served
by balancing the former means of protecting workers from sudden changes
18
 Comment, 28 U. Chi. L. Rev. 707, 732 (1963).
13
 Cox, Reflections upon Labor Arbitration, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 1482, 1490 (1959).
20
 J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 335 (1944).
21
 United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., supra note 14.
22
 Id. at 578.





in the employment relationship against the prerogative of owners independ-
ently to rearrange their businesses.
The impact of the Wiley ruling is already apparent. The Court was care-
ful to limit its decision to the circumstances of the case. 25 Under the following
circumstances, the successor was required to arbitrate under the arbitra-
tion clause of its predecessor's collective bargaining agreement: (1) disap-
pearance by merger (2) of a corporate employer (3) with a larger corporate
employer (4) in which almost all of the employees of the smaller firm, half
of whom are unionized (5) are mingled with the larger nonunionized force
of the successor firm (6) without difficulty, and ( 7) without a significant
change in the nature of the business entity and (8) where the Union made
known its claims. Two cases have recently been decided in different circuits on
the basis of Wiley.26 They are of some help in evaluating the importance of the
listed circumstances to courts which must in the future decide whether or not
specific arbitration clauses are to bind successor employers.
The Supreme Court in Wiley said that the Union could have abandoned
its right to arbitration if it had failed to make its claims clear. 27 The Court
evidently found it important that the claims of the Union let Wiley know
what to expect from the unionized Interscience employees. This consider-
ation is not likely to be of much weight in future decisions. The purchasing
or absorbing firm must certainly be aware of the existence of a collective
bargaining agreement. It is natural to suppose that the union and covered
employees will demand that provisions relating to settlement of grievances be
honored by the successor employer. Arbitration was directed in United
Steelworkers v. Reliance Universal Inc.,28 despite the fact that the Union
failed to demand that the collective bargaining agreement of the predecessor
be honored by the successor until the transaction was completed.
The practice of enforcing arbitration clauses against non-signers is not
limited to cases of merger. Both Wackenhut Corp. v. International Union,
United Plant Guard Workers" and United Steelworkers v. Reliance Univer-
sal, Inc.," involved sales of substantially all the assets of the predecessor
to the successor. Arbitration was directed in each. Even the Wiley Court
spoke generally in terms of cases in which ownership or corporate structure
of the enterprise is changed. 81
Considering the factor of geographical transfer, Wackenhut32 and
Reliance" pose stronger cases for arbitration than did Wiley. Where em-
25 Supra note 1, at 551.
28 United Steelworkers v. Reliance Universal, Inc., 335 F.2d 891 (3d Cir. 1964) ;
Wackenhut Corp. v. International Union, United Plant Guard Workers, 332 F.2d 954
(9th Cir. 1964).
27 Supra note 1, at 551.
28 United Steelworkers v. Reliance Universal, Inc., supra note 26, at 893.
29 Wackenhut Corp. v. International Union, United Plant Guard Workers, supra
note 26.
89 United Steelworkers v. Reliance Universal, Inc., supra note 26.
31 Supra note 1, at 551.
82 Wackenhut Corp. v. International Union, United Plant Guard Workers, supra
note 26. -
88 United Steelworkers v. Reliance Universal, Inc., supra note 26.
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ployees have undergone geographical or intra-plant transfer, working condi-
tions and duties of individuals cannot remain perfectly static. Arbitration
under the predecessor's collective bargaining agreement may then be inap-
propriate and should be denied if there is evidence that the transferred
employees no longer wish to be represented by the petitioner union, or that
the union represents an inappropriate bargaining unit. The former could
easily result if another union can more effectively represent the employees,
in their new situation." The latter could occur if the new employer were
forced to bargain with two or more unions representing different groups of
employees from the same factory. In both Wackenhut and Reliance, there
were no shifts of employees. The sale of assets in Wackenhut resulted in a
change in ownership, with negligible effect on the workers." The sale as a
going concern in Reliance did the same.3° The employment remained essen-
tially unchanged; only the employer was new. In Wiley, however, there was
a shift of workers to the successor's plant. In directing arbitration the Court
depended upon the facts that the effects of the transfer were minimal, and
it was made without difficulty. 87
The relative sizes of predecessor and successor were not significant in
Wackenhut and Reliance since the new owners' sizes made little difference to
the workers so long as their jobs were unchanged. In Wiley, however, the
transfer of employees made relative size an important consideration. The
large size of Wiley contributed to the finding that the Interscience employees
had been assimilated without difficulty in the sense that the workers could
have been assigned their former duties without upsetting the internal structure
of Wiley. Arbitration would probably not be directed against a successor
who could not effect a transfer without assignment of different duties to the
transferred employees.
Reliance indicates that the transfer and mingling in the Wiley fact
situation may have so weakened the case for arbitration that the Court felt
compelled to limit its ruling to enforcing the arbitration clause against a
non-signer." By way of dicta, both Reliance and Wackenhut propose that
under the fact situations of those cases the entire agreement is binding
upon the successor. The decrees provided only that arbitration proceed; but
the Reliance court stated that the collective bargaining agreement remained
the basic charter of labor relations after the change of ownership;" and
the Wackenhut court said that under the Wiley rule the successor is bound
by the collective bargaining agreement entered into by its predecessor."
It is not clear from Reliance whether the court would apply its extended
rule to the fact situation of Wiley, where there is a physical transfer of
employees. Such a result should be avoided. Enforcing an arbitration
84 NLRB v. McFarland, 306 F.2d 219, 220 (10th Cir. 1962).
35
 Wackenhut Corp. v. International Union, United Plant Guard Workers, supra
note 26, at 957.
86
 United Steelworkers v. Reliance Universal, Inc., supra note 26, at 893.
87 Supra note 1, at 551.
88
 United Steelworkers v. Reliance Universal, Inc., supra note 26, at 895.
89 Ibid.
40 Wackenhut Corp. v. International Union, United Plant Guard Workers, supra
note 26, at 958.
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clause against a non-signer is much different from enforcing the entire
agreement against him. When a dispute is sent to an arbitrator, it is assumed
that he will render the most equitable decision possible. Flatly enforcing
other parts of the agreement such as fixed wage rates or seniority terms
against the successor may not be a terrible burden on him where he takes
over an intact operation. In cases, however, where employees have been
moved into the successor's work force, inequities within the plant will soon
lead to industrial strife. The existence of separate agreements covering
workers whose duties and qualifications do not differ can lead at least to poor
morale and at most to strikes.
Even if the Reliance court were to limit its broad holding to cases
where no transfer of employees has taken place, it must be kept in mind that
Wiley is not the basis for any case following the Reliance -Wackenhut dicta.
The courts of the Third and Ninth Circuits seem to have forgotten in their
zeal to enforce collective bargaining agreements against non-signers that the
initial decision to abrogate contract theory and to compel a non-signer to
arbitrate was founded on the policy favoring arbitration as a means of
achieving industrial peace.
THOMAS j. CAMERON
Labor Law—Labor Management Relations Act—Sections 9(b) and
9(c) (5)—Extent of Organization as Controlling Factor.—Metro-
politan Life Ins. Co. v. NLRB. 1—Insurance Workers International Union,
AFL-CIO, requested the National Labor Relations Board to certify it as bar-
gaining representative for all twenty-threes debit agents at the Woonsocket,
Rhode Island, district office of the petitioner, a nation-wide insurance cor-
poration with over I,000 district offices . 3 Woonsocket was one of eight dis-
trict offices maintained in Rhode Island by petitioner, all of which are within
greater Providence. The nearest district office to Woonsocket is twelve miles
away, in Pawtucket. The Board certified the union, but petitioner claimed
that the only appropriate certifiable units would be (1) all its offices in the
United States, (2) all its offices in its New England Territory, or (3) all its
offices in Rhode Island. Petitioner asserted that in certifying this unit, the
Board treated as solely controlling the extent of employee organization, in
violation of Section 9(c) (5) of the Labor Management Relations Act. 4 On
petition to review and set aside the Board's order, the Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit HELD: Order set aside and enforcement denied; the Board
had violated section 9(c) (5) of the Act since extent of organization appeared
to control the Board's decision, no other basis appearing therein.
A vague and ambiguous term, extent of organization can mean either
the geographical extent to which a union has been organized, or the intensive
1 327 F.2d 906 (1st Cir. 1964), cert. granted, 32 U.S.L. Week 3115 (U.S. Oct. 12,
1964) (No. 98).
2 Brief for Respondent, p. 4.
8
 Brief for Petitioner, p. 6.
4 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (5) (1958).
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